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Lisa Guttentag Lederer, MPH 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2020 
 
Abstract 
 
 
According to its stated core values, the American Public Health Association (APHA) is 
committed to policies and practices based on “evidence that demonstrates effectiveness.” The 
meaning of this phrase, however, leaves much room for debate, and this paper’s Public Health 
significance lies in its contribution to such a debate. Elaborating on its assertion about evidence, 
the APHA warns researchers “not to take statistics at face value.” Accordingly, Public Health 
researchers have adopted a range of approaches for bolstering the statistical outputs of Randomized 
Controlled Trials (RCTs) -- though these results are frequently seen as the “gold standard” of 
medical and policy evidence. Not all of the approaches are equal, however, in their ability to 
integrate statistical results into actionable conclusions. This paper, after tracing the origins of the 
outsized prominence of RCT results in Public Health -- despite the APHA’s warning -- and 
locating the central weakness of these results to their limited portability between settings, evaluates 
the approaches that have been proposed thus far. Surveying different disciplinary perspectives 
shows that, while many researchers have attempted to isolate and investigate the context of Public 
Health interventions, truly bolstering RCT results requires researching the operations of the 
interventions themselves. The optimal approach, it is concluded, demands creating a multi-level 
definition in which mechanisms are outlined at each level, including that of the participant. 
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Preface 
This thesis is a position paper inspired by a longstanding methodological debate on how to 
study health and social care interventions. The debate has roots in the writings of John Stuart Mill 
(Mill, 1846) but continues today -- even appearing, in lively form, at the 2019 Conference on 
Dissemination & Implementation in Health. I first became interested in it as a graduate student in 
the History and Philosophy of Science, but the questions involved have popped up in my cross-
disciplinary work using methods from qualitative evaluations to RCTs. 
This paper would not have been completed without the insightful comments of Faculty and 
Staff at the Mental Illness Research and Education Clinical Center at VA Pittsburgh, especially 
Gretchen Haas, Gloria Klima, and Keri Rodriguez; of the VA Implementation Science Research 
Group, particularly Christine Kowalski, Borsika Rabin, and Russ Glasgow; of Alexis Kirk and 
Monicà Perez-Jollez; or of my thesis committee members Robert Coulter and Ada Youk.  It would 
not even have been started without the generous support of my supervisor at VA Pittsburgh, Adam 
Bramoweth; the incisive reflections of my Public Health advisor, Mary Hawk; or the emotional 
support of my husband Josh or the tolerance of my son Jonah, who (sometimes) allowed me to use 
Mama’s computer for something other than watching Cookie Monster videos. 
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1.0 Introduction 
On the American Public Health Association (APHA) webpage titled “our values,” one 
finds the assertion that “the best policies and practices are ones based on research, with evidence 
that demonstrates effectiveness.” Defining what type of information counts as “evidence,” then, 
and how to “demonstrate effectiveness” -- regardless of whether this evidence is to serve as the 
foundation for Evidence-Based Policy, Evidence-Based Programs, or Evidence-Based Practices -
- is essential for the field. This position paper argues that, in the crowded field of Public Health 
research approaches that aim to harness the power of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) 
without sacrificing real-world applicability, the function/form approach stands out for its 
conceptual and practical soundness. After recounting, in Section 2, the history of the association 
between RCTs and “evidence that demonstrates effectiveness,” in Section 3, the paper puts Public 
Health interventions in the same category – complex interventions -- as other healthcare 
interventions requiring qualitative investigation. In Section 4, techniques for researching such 
interventions by supplementing them with evidence about their context are reviewed, and their 
weaknesses noted; Section 5 describes two research approaches, including the function/form 
approach, aimed at defining interventions themselves. Section 6 provides further evidence that this 
approach can accommodate the real-world Public Health interventions. Section 7 concludes that 
funders should follow the Patient-Centered Outcome Research Institute in requiring researchers to 
describe their interventions in terms of functions and forms. 
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2.0 EBM, RCTs, and Public Health: A Brief History 
Due to a dearth of methodological debate in Public Health, the definition of “evidence that 
demonstrates effectiveness” has partly been determined by historical accident.  The race within 
many disciplines to become “evidence-based” can be traced to the Evidence-Based Medicine 
(EBM) movement launched by Gordon Guyatt and colleagues, who in 1992 introduced a “new 
approach to teaching the practice of medicine” by that name in the Journal of the American 
Medical Association (EBM Working Group, 1992). Shortly thereafter, a paper by the EBM 
Working Group in the same journal, titled “A method for grading healthcare recommendations,” 
featured a hierarchy on which studies evaluating medical interventions could be rated for their 
evidential strength (Guyatt et al., 1995). The promulgation of this, and of similar hierarchies by 
research organizations dedicated to making “evidence-based” recommendations (e.g., The 
Cochrane Collaboration, The Campbell Collaboration) has continued ever since; today, such 
hierarchies typically place meta-analyses of Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) at the top, with 
single RCTs immediately below, and “clinical expertise” at the bottom, meaning that conclusions 
reached through properly conducted RCTs should be trusted far more than those reached through 
clinical expertise.  
Like other medical fields, Public Health seeks a solid evidential basis and has aligned itself 
with the evidence-based medicine movement accordingly. Not long after the EBM evidence 
hierarchy had gained prominence in Public Health, however, researchers in that field, particularly 
in its community health and health promotion branches, began to see the apparent boost in 
objectivity delivered by EBM as a bias towards evidence from RCTs at the expense of other 
valuable evidence types. Ziglio, for example, representing the World Health Organisation’s 
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International Working Group on Evaluating Health Promotion Approaches, stated in 1997 that 
“[s]earching for effectiveness of health promotion could be assessed . . . against criteria that 
include matters of equity, empowerment, sustainability, accountability, acceptability, fiscal 
feasibility, amongst others. This would be a very different type of evidence-based intervention 
from what we can borrow from evidence-based medicine” (Ziglio, 1997, p. 32). Indeed, under the 
EBM evidence hierarchy, an intervention suggested by qualitative data from patients to contribute 
to patient empowerment would not be considered “evidence-based” at all. More recently, despite 
agreeing with the overall values of the EBM movement, researchers have objected to the 
applicability of RCT evidence across community settings. In the New England Journal of Medicine 
in 2017, Frieden still found it necessary to “describe the use of RCTs and alternative (and 
sometimes superior) data sources from the vantage point of public health, illustrate key limitations 
of RCTs, and suggest ways to improve the use of multiple data sources [besides RCTs] for health 
decision making” (Frieden, 2017, p. 465). 
Even for these critics, however, it is not the evidential strength of RCT results that is 
problematic, but researchers’ lack of consideration of the fit between study design and conclusions.  
Rychetnik, Frommer, Hawe, and Shiell (2002), considering whether Public Health interventions 
should be evaluated using the same criteria as those used in clinical practice (i.e., when treating or 
preventing illness in individuals, as opposed to when protecting health or preventing ill health in 
communities or groups) argue that “criticisms of the RCT are based on a consideration of ‘classic’ 
RCTs in which the intervention is standardized and the individual is the unit of randomization . . . 
[Other types of] RCTs have a long history of successful application in evaluating the effectiveness 
of social interventions” (Rychetnik et al., 2002, p. 121). Even harsh critics of RCTs as currently 
conducted have conceded that, despite serious limitations, they “provide the strongest evidence 
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about the causal effects of social interventions” (Bonell et al., 2012). The upshot of the 
methodological debate surrounding RCTs in Public Health is that, although the results flowing 
from RCTs should not dictate community health practice, RCT results -- when interpreted with 
caution -- provide evidence that facilitates practice by aiding practitioners in weighing the 
strengths of alternative programs and practices. 
In these debates, proponents of RCTs have typically pointed to their tendency “to evenly 
distribut[e] known and unknown factors among control and intervention groups, reducing the 
potential for confounding” (Frieden, 2017, p. 32). Often left implicit has been the essential 
cumulativeness of the EBM/RCT approach: evidence about a given intervention accumulates as it 
is subject to repeated trials. Michie, Fixsen, Grimshaw, & Eccles, advocating the use of RCTs for 
evaluating “Behaviour Change” interventions (including many Public Health interventions) do 
note, in the section called “the advantage of reporting interventions better,” that it is replication 
based on detailed RCT reports that “generates scientific knowledge” and “allows unhelpful or even 
harmful interventions to be avoided,” but these authors fail to note that this cumulativeness is 
especially beneficial -- even crucial -- in clinical and health science fields, where we have 
incomplete knowledge of the domain, and trials are always susceptible to unexpected external 
influences. After all, although the hallowed p<.05 figure references the chances that trial results 
were happenstance, the more “unknowns” are lurking in a given domain, the greater the likelihood 
that a “significant” result was not actually due to the expected (or, in most cases, manipulated) 
factor. Even for relatively simple healthcare interventions, the continuity of the EBM approach is 
needed to ensure that an evidence base is built around a given intervention beyond the flimsy 
conclusions of a single trial. When evaluating Public Health interventions with RCTs, though, 
accumulating multiple trials of the “same” intervention, even if these trials nominally involve the 
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same actions on the part of practitioners, may be like aggregating apples and oranges. That is, the 
actual intervention – i.e., what is intervened upon or manipulated, or the independent variable – 
may vary between trials. 
In fact, this cumulativeness problem with RCTs is felt across human service and healthcare 
disciplines that feature complex interventions. Depending on their disciplinary background, some 
researchers concerned with this issue have presumed that an Evidence-Based “core” which defines 
the intervention already exists – or awaits theorizing in other fields – and have thus debated how 
to describe the context surrounding this core. Others have presumed that “the” intervention that is 
transferred between practitioners necessarily includes core and context together and have debated 
how much local practitioners can adapt. The following sections argue that both debates are 
misdirected; a more fruitful debate would focus on how to describe the boundaries of the 
interventions themselves in a comprehensive yet replicable way. Then, using the example of a 
complex intervention that combines Public and Behavioral Health, it offers practical advice for the 
pursuit of such definitions. 
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3.0 Public Health Interventions as Complex Interventions 
In fact, the number of healthcare disciplines facing a growing need for assessment 
strategies besides RCTs, for the reason indicated above, is steadily increasing. Ironically, perhaps 
due to the increasing application of Bronfrenbrenner’s social-ecological model of human 
development to all of human health (McLaren & Hawe, 2005) healthcare interventions have grown 
in complexity and advanced (Dunn et al., 2019) but have simultaneously suffered from the EBM 
movement’s restrictive view of evidence. When weighing the applicability of RCT evidence to 
Public Health questions, researchers could benefit from considering perspectives on evaluating 
complex interventions from other medical fields.  
In 2000, recognizing the challenges of researching complex interventions, the Medical 
Research Council (MRC, the body responsible for coordinating and funding medical research in 
the UK) published a “Framework for the development and evaluation of RCTs for complex 
interventions to improve health” (updated in 2008).  The MRC defines “complex interventions” as 
“interventions with several interacting components such as occur in health service, public health 
and social policy” (6) and elaborates by listing relevant dimensions: 
•  Number of and interactions between components within the experimental and control 
interventions [in trials of the intervention] 
• Number and difficulty of behaviours required by those delivering or receiving the 
intervention 
•  Number of groups or organisational levels targeted by the intervention 
•  Number and variability of outcomes 
•  Degree of flexibility or tailoring of the intervention permitted (Craig et al., 2008, p. 7) 
 
Areas of medicine like Public Health, Behavioral Health, and Health Services are replete 
with interventions that are complex along a number of these dimensions. For example, the 
intervention known as Brief Behavioral Treatment for Insomnia (BBTI), which combines 
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Behavioral Health and Public Health elements, was adapted from the intervention known as 
Cognitive-Behavioral Treatment for Insomnia (CBTI) to overcome “numerous system-, provider-
, and patient-level factors [that] contribute to the gap between the high prevalence of insomnia and 
the relatively low use” of the latter treatment at VA hospitals (Bramoweth et al., 2018). BBTI earns 
a high score on all these dimensions. The treatment is a combination therapy that includes 
potentially interacting techniques that rely on multiple theoretical mechanisms, both 
neurobiological and behavioral. During the relatively brief course of treatment, the therapist must 
not only motivate patients to engage in multiple sessions but also to undertake difficult behavior 
changes that may themselves interact, such as inducing short-term sleep deprivation and avoiding 
their bed at all times outside a prescribed “sleep window.” The desired long-term outcomes of 
BBTI include not only better sleep, but also improved psychiatric and even metabolic function 
among recipients. The healthcare organization into which BBTI is introduced must devote time 
and resources to train clinicians in the technique and educate Primary Care providers about its 
availability so that they can make appropriate referrals. 
In fact, the above example highlights how the situation presented by healthcare 
interventions such as BBTI is even more intractable than the MRC definition of complexity allows. 
Further features that are intuitively complex include: 
• Openness to influence at many levels (rather than mere existence at many levels – e.g. 
fluctuations in the patient’s immediate social sphere, or in the political atmosphere that 
underlies funding, may have profound effects on impact) 
• Number of external barriers to individual patients (e.g. burdensome travel requirements in a 
certain region, unfamiliarity with the concept of preventive medicine among a certain 
population) 
• Scope of what “counts” as the intervention to healthcare organizations (e.g., an EBI 
described vaguely as a “multi-component, interdisciplinary intensive primary care program” 
might be “interdisciplinary” in that it involves cooperation between two medical departments 
in the same hospital, or between hospitals and research institutions); and 
• Existence/entrenchment of alternative treatments in the community at large. 
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Before providing the above list of defining characteristics, the 2008 MRC guidelines 
explain their rationale for doing so, naming problems that commonly beset researchers of complex 
interventions attempting to build an evidence base through RCTs. These include “standardising 
the design and delivery of the interventions” and “the length and complexity of the causal chains 
linking intervention with outcome” (Craig et al., 2008, p. 6). More elegantly, a 2010 paper in the 
Journal of Clinical Evaluation by Cartwright and Munro, “The limitations of randomized 
controlled trials in predicting effectiveness,” states the single assumption to which these problems 
can be traced – and suggests that they are not limited to health science fields: 
A properly conducted RCT provides evidence that the intervention works 
somewhere (i.e. in the trial). The decision maker, however, needs to estimate ‘will 
it work for us?’ In health and social care the underlying social and physical 
structures in which an intervention is devised cannot automatically be assumed to 
be comparable to target localities in causally relevant aspects . . . (Cartwright & 
Munro, 2010, p. 265) 
 
 The assumption pinpointed by Cartwright and Munro as faulty is that certain 
physical/social features of the setting where a given “health or social care intervention” has proven 
effective are similar, in some “right” but undefined way, to those where a decision-maker aims to 
transport the intervention. It is, in effect, the “cumulativeness” problem described in Section 2 -- 
the only difference being that the above quote refers to multiple settings in space, while the 
cumulativeness problem as described in the Introduction refers to multiple settings in time. In both 
cases, the factors indicating complexity named above (including both those named by the MRC 
and those added) would influence transfer between settings, either hampering the intervention or 
inflating researchers’ and practitioners’ impressions of its effectiveness. In implementing a 
complex intervention, implementers may engage in prescribed acts that they expect -- or hope -- 
to have certain effects, but the interventions interact with the setting, are full of changeable, and 
generally obscure, features that stem from the “underlying physical and social structures” referred 
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to by Cartwright and Munro; no number of RCTs is capable, without further evidential support, of 
indicating to a decision-maker whether or not a complex intervention that was beneficial in one 
setting -- or even many settings -- will “work for them.” According to the Centre for Evidence 
Based Medicine, an RCT can, theoretically, provide evidence for the intervention’s efficacy -- 
whether it works “under the ideal conditions of an investigation” (Last, 2001) -- conditions that 
hardly ever exist in the real world. But the RCT cannot, by itself, provide evidence for the 
intervention’s effectiveness, or whether it works “under usual conditions of clinical care for a 
particular group” (ibid.).  
The MRC guidelines imply that researchers can “patch up” RCTs of complex interventions, 
enabling practitioners in the real world to learn from them, by providing contextualizing details. 
The next section explores how similar advice has been presented from multiple perspectives. It 
then reveals how this advice is misguided. 
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4.0 Bolstering RCTs of Complex Interventions: Supplemental Approaches 
Facing a world full of unstable social and physical structures, Cartwright and Munro argue 
that, for RCTs to provide the robust evidence sought by Public Health researchers, “much more 
evidence, and much different in kind, is required” (Cartwright & Munro, 2010, p. 4). In fact, 
though, the need to contextualize quantitative results from social science experiments with 
qualitative data has been recognized for over half a century. Most social scientists would say that 
this is a problem of external validity; as introduced by Campbell and Stanley in 1959, external 
validity “asks the question of generalizability: To what populations, settings, treatment variables, 
and measurement variables can this effect be generalized?” (their emphasis, 5). In the health 
sciences, achieving gains in external validity usually requires loosening control over such variables 
as population and setting, which often leads to corresponding decreases in internal validity: “Did 
in fact the experimental treatments make a difference in this specific experimental instance?” 
(Campbell & Stanley, 1959, p. 5). Because internal validity, as these authors note, is “the basic 
minimum without which any experiment is uninterpretable” (5) health scientists are 
understandably hesitant to bolster external validity in exchange, and persuading them to attend to 
external validity at all has required considerable effort (Green & Glasgow, 2006).  
Noting that additional evidence is needed, though, is not enough. Over the past few 
decades, researchers have proposed a plethora of methods for producing the necessary kind of 
evidence, many of which have simply involved providing supplementary details or measures. The 
strategies proposed for “cushioning” RCTs in this way fall into two general categories: those 
guided by intuition/theory and those guided by pre-existing lists. 
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4.1 Theoretical/Intuitive Approaches 
According to the MRC, the role of adding the kind of evidence that renders RCT results 
sufficiently robust can be fulfilled by process evaluation. When nested inside an experimental 
design like an RCT, the potential of such evaluations is wide – they “can be used to assess fidelity 
and quality of implementation, clarify causal mechanisms, and identify contextual factors 
associated with variation in outcomes” (3) – but apparently only includes “clarifying,” rather than 
defining, the intervention’s operative causal mechanisms. That is, process evaluations are intended 
to provide evidence that is supplementary to, but strengthens, the central assessment by RCTs. 
The follow-up document to the MRC guidelines that provides guidance specific to process 
evaluation allows that, in determining what questions should drive such evaluations, researchers 
may be guided by a hodgepodge of “social science theory” and “other factors such as past 
experience or common sense” (Moore et al., 2015, p. 1).  Problematically, however, researchers 
have been pointing out the foibles of such “common sense,” including that of medical 
professionals, for decades (Engelhardt et al., 1969); the biases that randomization serves to reduce, 
for example, may creep into the way evaluators carve out subgroups for analysis. Furthermore, the 
guidance implies that, even if evaluators strictly pursue the issues highlighted by a social science 
theory, they may help themselves to a broad range of such theories, being careful only to “avoid 
focusing narrowly on inappropriate theories from a single discipline. For example, psychological 
theory may be useful for interventions that work at the individual level but is less useful when 
intervening with organisations or at wider social levels . . .” (4). Such a free-ranging choice leaves 
room for bias beyond what an RCT would permit. This “hodgepodge” approach may be effective 
for local program evaluations that are not meant to support generalized inferences, but is not 
appropriate when findings are reported alongside supposedly generalizable RCTs.  Besides 
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providing the opportunities for bias noted above, process evaluations may vary by local setting 
according to fundamental issues, such as which factors merit investigation. Even the ideal process 
evaluation, unlike the ideal RCT, will often generate entirely non-portable lessons.   
In fact, Munro and Bloor’s experience attempting to integrate a process evaluation with an 
RCT confirms the difficulty predicted above. In response to an apparent process evaluation craze 
sparked by the 2000 MRC advice, these Public Health researchers warned in 2010 that “it is 
important that process evaluations are not oversold: they are not a miracle ingredient” (Munro & 
Bloor, 2010, p. 708).  They explain the perils of assuming that qualitative interviews in a process 
evaluation – which are designed to shed light on the factors practitioners and participants consider 
significant -- will straightforwardly improve future implementations of the intervention. 
Munro and Bloor’s trial involved an evaluation of a secondary school intervention 
employing “peer supporters to have informal conversations with classmates about the dangers of 
cigarette and cannabis smoking. Considering the process evaluation results, the researchers reflect 
that based on the “general agreement, among peer supporters in all the focus groups and across the 
different schools that cannabis was more difficult to talk about than cigarette smoking.” Their 
comments suggest that the reluctance to discuss cannabis is a significant factor causing a reduction 
in the number of cannabis-related conversations; a reasonable response would seem to be re-
designing the intervention to remove “the element of discretion for peer supporters that allows 
them to concentrate on prevention of cigarette smoking” alone (Munro & Bloor, 2010, p. 701).  
Quantitative results from the RCT, however, suggest a different story: despite a significant 
difference between the reported number of conversations about cigarettes and the reported number 
of conversations about cannabis in one school receiving the intervention (23% vs. 9%) there was 
no such difference at another school (34% vs. 27%). Although it is not a given that the RCT results, 
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rather than the process evaluation results, tell the “true” story, these researchers’ experience does 
show that even for people intimately involved in the intervention, identifying the factors an RCT 
would suggest to be causally relevant (such as teenagers’ apparent reticence about marijuana) is 
not an intuitive task. 
Furthermore, while the causally relevant factors in complex interventions vary between 
settings, the intuitively causally relevant factors (though they are not necessarily the same) also 
vary, leaving researchers and practitioners with a sea of (possibly conflicting) papers to read in 
preparation for implementation. Munro and Bloor predict that the project of transporting complex 
interventions among settings by integrating process evaluations with RCTs is doomed by practical 
considerations. The MRC and those who echo their advice, they argue 
are looking for an awful lot of bangs for their buck . . . these complex interventions 
are frequently multi-site trials, involving perhaps a score or more of clinics (or 
communities, or schools, etc.) and perhaps an equal number of intervention delivery 
teams . . . Enormous effort expended, mountains of complex data collected, and no 
earthly chance of making any sense of it all. (Munro & Bloor, 2010, p. 4) 
 
Munro and Bloor’s observations suggest that intuitive approaches to supplementing RCT 
results face insurmountable problems: the guidelines provided to implementers are too fuzzy to 
reliably result in datasets that are both manageable and relevant. 
4.2 Pre-Existing List Approaches 
 Accordingly, some researchers have attempted to focus the data that accompanies RCT 
results by prescribing what qualitative information should be collected and reported. Notably, 
some such prescriptions are unrealistic. All journals published by BMC, for example, such as 
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Implementation Science, “strongly recommend” that authors refer to the minimum reporting 
guidelines listed on the website hosted by the EQUATOR network (Enhancing the Quality and 
Transparency Of health Research; https://www.equator-network.org/). For social and 
psychological interventions, the category into which most complex health interventions would fall, 
the checklist of items or features to be reported simply demands “sufficient details to allow 
replication” (Movsisyan et al., 2019, sec. eligibility criteria). Because perfect replication is an 
impossibility -- at the very least, a new trial will focus on a new population of individuals – this 
requirement seems unattainable. 
Where this strategy has paid dividends in healthcare research is in areas characterized by 
“simple” interventions, such as pharmacy, where researchers have attended to a predetermined 
list of “external” factors such as age, sex, and disease severity. In such areas, this listing strategy 
typically reveals what contexts are appropriate for an intervention because, if important differences 
exist between the reactions of different individuals to a given drug, they usually align with these 
features. 
For areas of healthcare characterized by complex interventions, however, where the 
number of significant features is practically infinite, no such list exists (though researchers have 
repeatedly attempted to construct one). Implementation Science researchers, for example, have 
often “carved off” the downstream, or implementation, phase and enumerated “implementation 
factors” that tend to be causally relevant across interventions. These lists may sometimes be 
appropriate in new contexts – but a standardized approach to replication does not guarantee that 
the right features – or, to use Cartwright and Munro’s language, the causally relevant factors – 
will be captured. For example, historical events like a war or election may influence a behavioral 
health intervention by affecting the psychological well-being of the entire country, but historical 
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factors do not often appear on lists of commonly significant features. The long and motley list of 
“contextual” factors that may impact intervention success presents organizations attempting 
replication with a daunting task; even organizations with the time to delve into the literature and 
select factors relevant to their context are unlikely to have the foreknowledge to do so. 
Supplementing the results of RCTs of complex interventions by describing the features that are 
commonly relevant is little better than the intuitive approach of supplementing them with whatever 
descriptions seem relevant. 
Instead of generating competing lists of potentially significant “external” factors, or 
assuming that implementers’ intuition will guide them in selecting the relevant factors, 
implementation science researchers could build an evidence base about what is internal and what 
is external to a given intervention. Because it is sometimes assumed that elaborate descriptions of 
the “outside” of an intervention can be pulled from, pending future theorizing, to amend the 
definition of the “inside” (i.e., the parts of the intervention that are transferred between 
organizations and are not adaptable) these tasks of describing and defining are not generally seen 
as directly opposed. While researchers of “simple” healthcare interventions, though, can often look 
to biomedical theory to determine inside and outside, complex intervention researchers have no 
well-defined boundaries to guide them; so it is up to them to discover whether seemingly 
contextual features are actually essential. Taking advantage of the cumulativeness of evidence 
from RCTs – that is, comparing apples to apples only – requires continually conducting research 
to find the definition of a given complex intervention, or in more pragmatic terms, to determine 
what should be transferred between researchers. The final sections trace the evolution of how 
researchers have defined this inside of interventions, and then explain how a relatively recent 
approach to definition, the core functions and forms approach, is superior to previous approaches. 
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5.0 The Core Wars 
References to an intervention “core” often arise in health science fields today in debates 
about procedures for intervention adaptation: the modification of components outside this core 
(Movsisyan et al., 2019). Though the topic of healthcare intervention adaptation only “came to the 
fore” in 2000, however (ibid., “eligibility criteria” section) the concept of an intervention “core” 
is rooted in a much earlier controversy. Researchers in human service fields outside of healthcare, 
fields that are traditionally more cognizant of social and communal factors, have long struggled 
with issues of intervention complexity. In these fields, the issue analogous to how to define 
successful interventions is how to spread successful service programs. In the 1980s and 1990s, a 
burgeoning literature existed on the technology transfer of human service programs between 
organizations. Such “technologies” are similar in many ways, and thus face nearly the same 
roadblocks, as do today’s complex healthcare interventions; whether based in research funded by 
the Department of Health and Human Services -- and thus labeled “human service programs” -- or 
by the National Institutes of Health -- and thus labeled “healthcare interventions” – they are multi-
component, rely on multiple societal levels, and ultimately aim to improve lives. 
Though the technology transfer debate centered around the extent to which adaptation by 
local organizations should be permitted or conversely, how extensive the unchangeable “core” 
should be (Blakely et al., 1987). Many human service technology transfer researchers recognize 
the importance of pinpointing “crucial elements” (Embry, 2004) “evidence-based kernels” (Michie 
et al., 2009) or whatever their preferred term may be for the defining parts of a human service 
technology; but the term, and accompanying conception, that has ultimately taken hold is one 
proposed by Michie, Fixsen and colleagues (D L Fixsen et al., 2005, p. 24).  Crucially, they 
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grounded this core components concept by drawing extended parallels with “Industry Research,” 
and then extended its reach by applying it to both human service technologies and healthcare 
interventions. For example, in one of the earliest guidelines on Dissemination and Implementation 
in the NIH National Information Center (NICHSR) core components are defined as “the most 
essential and indispensable components of an intervention practice or program” (Blase & Fixsen, 
2013, p. 3). The authors then quote an industry research journal article, elaborating that core 
components specify “which traits [of consumer goods, or in this case, healthcare interventions] are 
replicable, how these attributes are created, and the characteristics of environments in which they 
are worth replicating” (ibid). In a later research brief for the Office of Human Services Policy 
about core intervention components, Michie and Fixsen add that they are “principles” that are 
“operationalized” and can be either “theory-driven” or “empirically derived;” specifying further, 
they state that core components are those that “are intended to, or have been demonstrated through 
research to, positively impact the proximal outcomes that address the identified needs and that 
increase the likelihood that longer-term outcomes will be achieved” (Dean L Fixsen & Blase, 1993, 
p. 598).  
Working to clarify the “core components” definition of a given intervention, i.e. what is 
internal to the intervention, represents a significant advance over supplementing the presumed 
intervention with qualitative data. This is because definitions based on core components can 
theoretically include a constellation of seemingly “contextual” features, enabling them to be 
replicated without presenting practitioners with the task of hypothesizing which features of the 
intervention-context complex are significant. As in the case of process evaluations, however, 
researchers have an impossibly broad field of candidate components to designate as core. Though 
Fixsen and colleagues stress that the list of core components must encompass those factors that 
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are theoretically relevant, and not merely tangible or salient (Michie et al., 2009) the mere fact that 
an intervention component (such as the provision to consumers of volunteer activities) is included 
in a documented theory does not preclude its inclusion in many other, conflicting theories. 
Furthermore, the core components concept is, by Fixsen and colleagues’ own admission, a 
near-replica of the “Arrow core” concept attached to the information economist Kenneth Arrow 
(an early paper of theirs asserts that “we have much to learn from industry on the subject of creating 
realities” for human service consumers; (Fixsen & Blase, 1993). While the neoclassical economic 
theories from which the core components concept derived are about series of transactions, 
complex health interventions are about webs of interactions. This difference means that while the 
“core components” of economic theories are causes that slot into linear equations, the core 
components in theories of healthcare interventions should be both causes and effects, subject to 
forces arising from feedback loops and nonlinearities.  
Focusing on Public Health, Hawe, Shiell, and Riley (2004) thus questioned the very nature 
of this core. Under the core components conception, the social programs (or interventions) 
themselves were still viewed as “consisting of a number of relatively well-specified [core] program 
components” (Blakely et al., 1987, 255) that were separable for the purpose of measuring fidelity 
to the initial model; program fidelity, as Blakely and colleagues explain in their brief history of 
the fidelity-adaptation debate, “could then be defined as the number or proportion of finite program 
components that were implemented” (ibid.). Hawe and colleagues objected to this definition. 
Complexity Science, they protested, tells us that a complex system (or intervention) is more than 
the sum of its parts; reducing it to its components changes its identity (i.e. alters what is measured 
and adapted.) In “How out of control can a randomized controlled trial be?” they ask 
could a controlled trial design (which requires something to be replicable 
and recognisable as the intervention in each site) ever be appropriate to evaluate a 
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(truly) complex intervention? The answer is yes. The crucial point lies in “what” is 
standardised. Rather than defining the [core] components of the intervention as 
standard . . . what should be defined as standard are the steps in the change process 
that the elements are purporting to facilitate or the key functions that they are meant 
to have . . . these [functions] could then take on different forms according to local 
context, while achieving the same objective (Hawe et al., 2004, pp. 1561–1562). 
  
Viewing interventions through the lens of Complexity Science, as do Hawe, Shiell, and 
Riley, reminds us that the intervention core must include (initially) downstream factors that are 
hard to predict due to feedback loops and nonlinearities. In other words, expecting interventions 
that only include a part of the core components to achieve the intervention goals in part would be 
like expecting partial success from a surgical procedure that included some of the crucial steps 
(e.g., removal of the appendix) but not all of them (e.g., stitching up the surrounding skin 
afterward). This objection is the converse of the objection, discussed above, that researchers will 
often include too many core components in their definition: in the case of public health 
interventions, components that are essential to intervention success -- such as stigma-free 
accessibility -- are often missed. As Cartwright and Munro’s quote about underlying social and 
physical structures suggests, a theory is no match for all the elusive components of a complex 
intervention. 
Hawe, Shiell, and Riley thus present arguments based in Complexity Science for a new 
approach to healthcare “technology” (intervention) transfer: the function/form approach; yet their 
insightful argument leaves much to be spelled out in terms of practical application. The section 
below provides a more thorough exploration of their approach that goes beyond the discipline of 
Complexity Science. 
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6.0 Identifying Core Functions and Forms, 
The pragmatic value of Hawe, Shiell, & Riley’s (2004) functions/forms approach depends 
on whether it can guide researchers and implementers in their real-world endeavors. Admittedly, 
the approach might go against researchers’ and implementers’ initial EBM-based impulses, by 
asking them to treat two intervention implementations that differ in obvious ways as the “same” 
intervention, including, even, aggregating evidence for them. After all, two drugs (for example) 
with different physical forms (i.e. chemical structures) would usually be considered 
different.things.  
There is no rule, however, that the core intervention functions, or what is compared in each 
trial, must be structural or even sensible. While the core components approach encourages 
researchers to seize only upon the most visible or salient aspects of an intervention, identifying 
core functions/forms is a comprehensive process that involves integrating the perspectives of a 
variety of stakeholders. Most importantly, as explained below, this approach leaves room for the 
multiple levels of abstraction that, as emphasized by Cartwright, characterize the practical 
application of scientific theories. 
The tendency of the core components approach to under-inclusion, and of the disadvantage 
of squeezing all essential intervention ingredients onto a single conceptual level, has been 
illustrated by an actual attempt at enumerating the core components of CBTI and BBTI (Cognitive 
Behavioral Treatment or Insomnia and Brief Behavioral Treatment for Insomnia, respectiverly). 
For decades, fidelity scales have been used by psychotherapy researchers – and more recently, by 
human service program researchers – to “assess the adequacy of implementation of 
[psychotherapeutic or human service] program models” (Bond et al., 2000, p. 75; for a history of 
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fidelity scales, see (Mowbray et al., 2003). Fixsen and Blase vaguely insist that such measures “do 
not necessarily tell the whole story about what is required for effective use of an intervention in 
typical service settings” (Blase & Fixsen, 2013, p. 5) In practice, however, researchers often see 
such scales explicitly as lists of core components and neglect to go further in defining their 
intervention of interest. 
During their national “rollout” of CBTI (Cognitive Behaioral Treatment for Insomnia) at 
VA medical centers, for example, Karlin et al. (2013**) constructed fidelity scales intended to 
measure therapist faithfulness to the core of the intervention/treatment. Components to be assessed 
for their presence in therapist treatment delivery include: evaluation of the patient’s “sleep diary;” 
mention and exposition of stimulus control principles; mention and exposition of the principles of 
sleep restriction therapy; use of cognitive therapy and “guided discovery”; attention to patient 
adherence; attention to hyperarousal; assignment of homework; interpersonal effectiveness; 
collaboration, provision and elicitation of feedback; application of cognitive and behavioral 
components to te patient’s particular case; and overall competency (Karlin et al., 2013). Therapists 
are rated on each item using a 4-point rubric. To adapt the scale for use with the briefer behavioral 
treatment for insomnia (BBTI) other researchers (e.g Bramoweth, *) have simply removed items, 
such as “use of cognitive therapy and guided discovery,” referring to the therapist’s direct efforts 
to alter patient cognitions. Thus, while the CBTI scale includes 11 items, the BBTI version includes 
only 9.  
In contrast to componential approaches, however, the function/form approach, as 
elaborated by Hawe, Shiell, and Riley (2009) advocates viewing Public Health interventions as 
“events in [complex] systems.” Adopting this view implies recognizing the intervention setting 
and target population, usually considered merely contextual features of the intervention, as 
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fundamental to its definition -- and as fundamental to the theories on which it is based, and that 
may arise from it. The CBTI and BBTI fidelity scales reflect intervention functions only from the 
perspective of the clinician, or at the provider level; this restricted perspective is reflected in the 
fact that in the above scales, CBTI purportedly includes more core components than does BBTI. 
In fact, the latter intervention—which takes into account “contextual” elements such as patient 
preference for brevity – is theoretically more complex. As elaborated below, however, in 
identifying the functions and forms of CBTI/BBTI, we would also look upward – to 
neurobiological theories such as theories about sleep restriction, and to social psychology theories 
such as theories about stigma -- and downward, to the patient-level accounts necessary to fill in 
gaps concerning the intervention’s form (i.e. its mechanism of action). In short, the relative 
simplicity of the “checklist” approach to ensuring fidelity to an intervention’s core often comes at 
the expense of under-inclusion and overinclusion of crucial components. 
(Kirk et al., 2019) and (Perez Jolles et al., 2019) each exemplified the combined upward-
looking and downward-looking strategy by applying it to an actual healthcare intervention. The 
functions and forms they used in defining their interventions of focus, as well as theoretical 
examples given by Hawe, Shiell, and Riley, are listed in Table I. Their choices of function and 
form are further detailed in the subsections below.  
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Table 1: Functions and Forms from the Literature 
Paper Representative Function Representative Form 
Hawe, Shiell, & Riley (2004) Distribute information on 
depression tailored to local 
literacy, language, culture, 
and learning styles 
Patient information kit on 
depression written by each site 
Kirk et al. (2019) Do not lead the conversation 
by mentioning hospice, start 
the conversation [about end-
of-life care] by discussing care 
goals, needs, and preferences.  
Framing, as prescribed by 
each site, of exact 
script/wording detailed in 
intervention protocol 
Perez-Jolles et al. (2019) Offer enhanced options for 
access to in-person care 
In-person care available 
outside of traditional business 
hours 
6.1 Identifying Core Intervention Functions 
The role of the form/function dichotomy in the theories of various scholarly fields, from 
Architecture to Disability Studies, is the subject of a rich philosophical literature (Nanay, 2010); 
but a difference along the concreteness-abstractness is essential throughout. In the Hawe, Shiell, 
and Riley (2004) model, intervention components identified at a relatively high level of abstraction 
that is characteristic of researchers’ theories belong in the function category. Hawe and colleagues, 
describing a fictitious intervention, name a sole function; Kirk et al. and Perez et al., who both 
apply the form/function framework to real-world complex interventions, each name several 
functions per intervention. In all cases, though, features in this category are closely tied to the 
intervention’s motivating theory or theories. In identifying core functions, Perez-Jolles et al. (2019) 
referred to the relevant literature (e.g. journal articles) while, due to an absence of relevant 
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literature in their case, Kirk et al. (2019) interviewed the authors of the article introducing their 
chosen intervention. 
In outlining a step-by-step process for identifying core forms and functions post hoc (i.e., 
after the intervention has been in practice for some time) Kirk et al. (2019) equate “function” with 
“purpose.” Similarly, Perez-Jolles et al. (2019), applying the function/form framework to an 
ongoing intervention, state that functions are “the intended structural and procedural goals and 
purposes to reach the intervention goals” (1034). Even in scholars’ interpretation of Aristotle, 
though, the equation of function with purpose has been criticized as too simple (Lacks & Morin, 
1992); the function concept features feasible action. Peace, for example, could not be a function; 
fostering constructive dialogue could. Importantly, furthermore, functions evolve (Acosta et al., 
2014); they maintain a degree of flexibility as is necessary for interventions arising from scientific 
theories that themselves constantly evolve, although intervention functions remain constant across 
multiple contexts. 
In fact, the simultaneous existence of multiple functions, as in the Kirk et al. (2019) and 
Perez-Jolles et al. (2019) interventions, provides another reason – left implicit by Hawe, Shiell, 
and Riley (2004) -- for viewing components as a whole instead of assessing them piecemeal: 
functions stemming from different theories may work together synergistically. For example, BBTI 
combines Sleep Restriction Therapy, which relies on the neurobiology of short-term sleep 
deprivation, with Stimulus Control, which relies on principles of behavioral conditioning (i.e., 
associating the bed with a single activity: sleep).  Each of these treatments has been shown to be 
effective individually (Movsisyan et al., 2019) but they operate best in tandem: restricting one’s 
sleep window increases adherence to Stimulus Control treatment by reducing one’s opportunity to 
engage in non-sleep activities (such as watching TV) in bed, while eliminating time spent awake 
 25 
in bed (i.e. “lolling around”) increases adherence to Sleep Restriction Therapy by reducing one’s 
opportunity to inadvertently fall asleep. Restricting the patient’s sleep window and eliminating 
time the patient spends awake in bed could thus be considered synergistic functions of BBTI. 
Both of the above functions, moreover, sit comfortably with another potential function for 
BBTI that is associated more with Public Health than Behavioral Health research. This potential 
function, due to the location of BBTI in the Primary Care wing rather than the Behavioral Health 
wing, is: decreasing stigma associated with seeking treatment for Behavioral Health. Note that 
the three BBTI functions mentioned above all exist at varying levels of abstraction or universality: 
Neurobiological principles predict that all patients would be affected similarly by Sleep 
Restriction Therapy; the Behavioral strategy of strengthening the association between the bed and 
sleep will work only for patients with consistent sleeping-places; and the stigma associated with 
seeking Behavioral Health treatment has been found to be most significant, in the US, among 
veteran patients (Cartwright, 2010).  Multiple levels of abstraction can thus co-exist within the 
function category, reflecting the multiple levels at which scientific theorizing may take place. 
6.2 Identifying Core Intervention Forms 
The split between form and function is pragmatic: forms, unlike functions, are constrained 
by the resources available to local implementers and the idiosyncrasies of the population of 
participants in their intervention. As Perez-Jolles et al. (2019) put it, forms are “specific strategies 
or activities that may be customized by local contexts that are needed to carry out core functions” 
(1033). Forms not only may be customized but should be customized in accordance with local 
factors, as studies have repeatedly shown that at least some degree of local adaptation is not only 
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inevitable but advantageous (Damschroder et al., 2015). To identify core forms, Perez-Jolles et al. 
(2019) culled descriptions from study reports of the actual shape taken in different contexts by 
their chosen intervention; Kirk et al. (2019) simply consulted the original intervention protocol. 
Just as forms are expected to vary widely between different context, different methods may be 
optimal to elucidate functions and forms, depending on the available literature, implementers’ 
familiarity with it, etc. 
 An important source of information on intervention form, however, was absent from the 
Perez-Jolles et al. (2019) and Kirk et al. (2019) studies: neither sought out the experiences of 
intervention participants, whose activities outside the medical office and personal observations, 
after all, represented an important part of the change process meant to be initiated by the 
interventions. This absence may reflect an assumption that patient reports would not correspond 
to intervention functions in a reliable way. Once again, Cartwright’s metaphors about the 
application of theory to the real world are apt here: she stresses the importance of “building 
ladders” between abstract theories and concrete realities (Machamer et al., 2000, p. 3).    
 An example of how to use qualitative data from intervention participants fruitfully comes 
from a hybrid clinical trial combining an RCT comparing BBTI and CBTI with qualitative 
interviews focused on implementation factors (Bramoweth et al., unpublished data) from the 
Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (Harvey, 2002). In response to the 
questions Did [the intervention] work? and Why? -- expected to be introductory, rather than to 
yield reportable data – we received rich accounts detailing how the participants believed treatment 
components had operated. Importantly, furthermore, these accounts often fit neatly into the 
mechanisms hypothesized by scientists to underlie the treatments. (Note that “mechanism” is used 
here in the general sense of Machamer, Darden, and Craver [2000]: “entities and activities 
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organized such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or 
termination conditions” (Bond et al., 2000) It does not presuppose, as it seems to in Kirk et al. 
[2019] the higher level of theorizing typically associated with functions.)  
For example, in their accounts of intervention successes, patients repeatedly mentioned 
(unprompted) the benefits of reviewing their “sleep diaries,” or daily logs of sleep patterns, with 
providers each week. Their assessments suggest that, at least for BBTI and CBTI at the VA 
Pittsburgh Medical Center, seeing documented progress and receiving benign explanations for 
their condition contributed to patients’ improvement. Representative quotes include: 
Veteran: And, I think the fact that the person sees how effective it is…  
Interviewer: Um-hum.  
Veteran: …you know, by keeping the diaries. 
Interviewer: Right.  
Veteran: That really helps because they’re seein’, if they look back, they see progress.  
 
Veteran: It really helped me to understand… 
Interviewer: Um-hum. 
Veteran: …well, if I guess if it would be anything to dislike is that I still don’t sleep straight 
through. I still wake up [but] I kind of understand how that happens and why that happens. 
 
These accounts fit nicely with the mechanism outlined by Harvey (Bond et al., 2000) in 
her Cognitive Model of Insomnia.  Patients’ beliefs, modified by the documented evidence of the 
sleep diaries and explanations, no longer lead to worry – in effect breaking the arrow in the model 
between those constructs – and thus no longer contribute to selective attention and monitoring or, 
ultimately, to the misperception that Harvey hypothesizes lies at its root. Thus although reducing 
cognitive arousal might be listed as a function of BBTI/CBTI, to be standardized among all sites 
where they are practiced, an investigation into intervention forms -- which might include 
participant interviews like the ones described above -- would likely be a Quality Improvement 
project taking place at the facility level.  
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7.0 Conclusions 
The practical upshot of this paper is that Public Health researchers would benefit both from 
defining novel interventions in terms of functions/forms, and from viewing existing interventions 
in function/form terms when planning implementation. Ultimately, though, it is up to funders to 
encourage the widespread adoption of the function/form approach in Public Health research. The 
Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute (PCORI) has led the way in this endeavor, 
specifying in its methodological standards statement online that researchers conducting PCOR 
must  
describe the intervention and comparator under study and clearly define 
aspects related to core functions and forms. Core functions refer to the intended 
purpose(s) of the interventions. The form of the interventions includes the intended 
modes of delivery, providers involved, materials or tools required, dose, and 
frequency/intensity. The description should also explicitly indicate to whom the 
intervention is aimed (e.g., patient, provider, hospital, health system). 
 
While this interpretation of Hawe and colleagues’ suggested approach does not capitalize 
on its basis in Complex Systems -- e.g., does not encourage researchers to explore multiple 
perspectives in defining functions, or to highlight potential synergies between them – it prompts 
researchers to see beyond a restrictive “fidelity” lens. 
This paper is not intended to “solve” all the dilemmas posed when Public Health 
researchers attempt to apply RCT evidence to complex interventions. Remaining questions include 
how to assess fidelity – an essential procedure in constructing an evidence base (Bond et al., 2000) 
– of functions, given that local facilities’ and organizations’ directly measurable embodiments of 
these functions will vary in form. Another unanswered question is: at what point does so much 
evidence in favor of a particular form exist that it is recognized as a universal function? For 
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example, the “sleep diary” provider conversations mentioned above might be irreplaceable by 
other concrete forms of the hypothesized general function reducing cognitive arousal. In that case, 
though, a more specific and actionable function than the above would be documenting daily sleep 
patterns. If similar data is obtained in other facilities’ qualitative interviews with BBTI/CBTI 
patients, studies comparing treatments with and without the documenting function would provide 
evidence in this matter. 
 This paper also brings multiple disciplinary perspectives to debates related to complex 
healthcare interventions, clarifying these debates and assessing the arguments that have been 
advanced. It argues that our current incomplete understanding of Evidence-Based Interventions 
(or Practices or Policies) requires researchers to exercise humility in investigating them and to take 
care in bequeathing, to future implementers, actionable knowledge grounded in the patient voice.   
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